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Why Alternative Dickens? This collection originally arose out of ways of thinking about 
Dickens explored in the bicentenary conference I co-organised at the University of 
Portsmouth, The Other Dickens (2012), in which we invited papers that considered ‘others’ 
within Dickens, other approaches to Dickens, and other aspects of his life and work that had 
not received prominent critical attention, across both Victorian and NeoVictorian contexts. 
However, there was also a sense in which Dickens had already been comprehensively 
‘othered’ since the millennium, most notably in John Bowen’s Other Dickens (2000), but also 
in Lillian Nayder’s The Other Dickens: A Life of Catherine Hogarth (2011), which partially 
inspired the Portsmouth conference. ‘Other’, it seems, has become overly capacious, or runs 
the risk of becoming familiar; ‘alternative,’ by contrast, reframes questions of otherness. 
‘Alternative’ seems culturally and politically self-divided in a way that the more 
psychoanalytically valenced ‘other’ is not. On one hand, alternative politics and alternative 
comedy suggest radical (in the political sense) resistance; on the other, the last few years have 
seen the emergence of ‘alternative facts’ and, of course, the alt-right. This tension means that 
‘alternative’ carries within itself the potential of its collapse; as Mark Fisher notes in 
Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (2009), the self-consciously alternative can all 
too easily be co-opted into dominant ideologies. “‘Alternative’ and ‘independent’ don’t 
designate something outside mainstream culture,” Fisher notes, “rather, they are styles, in fact 
the dominant styles, within the mainstream” (9). The aim of these articles is not so much to 
place Dickens at one end of the alternative spectrum or the other (as if Dickens turned out to 
be either Alexei Sayle or Sean Spicer), but to explore moments of the alternative in his work: 
where his novels deal with competing outcomes, storylines, and where Dickens himself 
negotiates a literary marketplace of alternatives to himself, persuading readers that he is a 
viable alternative to, say, Reynolds. Imbricated with these approaches is the idea of 
counterfactuality (so-called alternative history), an increasingly relevant cultural tool. 
Counterfactuality has currency: Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004) re-entered the 
bestseller lists in late 2016 following the election of Donald Trump, while closer to Dickens 
studies, Robert Douglas-Fairhurst’s Becoming Dickens: The Invention of a Novelist (2011) 
begins with a vision of an alternative 1855 inspired by William Gibson and Bruce Sterling’s 
The Difference Engine (1990). Douglas-Fairhurst notes that Dickens is a conspicuous absence 
from Gibson and Sterling’s novel, invoking another of Dickens’ interests when he says that 
“The absence of Dickens is surprising. No Victorian writer is harder to make vanish through 
a counterfactual conjuring trick” (3). 
Alternatives – or their lack – were in the news not long after The Other Dickens. In 
March 2013, then Prime Minister David Cameron justified his austerity politics with recourse 
to the claim that “There is no alternative” (Parker, n.p). The echo of Margaret Thatcher’s use 
of the phrase, and her famed espousal of ‘Victorian values’ (for which, read an ideologically 
rather than historically constructed model of Victorianism), was deliberate. As Fisher argues, 
“there is no alternative” is “as succinct a slogan of capitalist realism as you could wish for” 
(8). Yet the phrase has a genealogy that extends further back than late capitalism. The 
pscittine Cameron may have been quoting Thatcher, but Thatcher in turn drew on a rhetorical 
inheritance from Herbert Spencer, whose Social Statics (1851) obsessively uses “There is no 
alternative” and its variants to argue for a classical economic liberalism. We might start, 
therefore, by considering the Victorian, and more specifically Dickensian, deployment of 
‘there is no alternative.’  
Unlike the Thatcherian usage Spencer uses the phrase to reflect not only on the 
content of a philosophical position, but also on the manner in which that position is to be 
logically presented (as in, for instance, on the derivation of a first principle of liberty): 
There is clearly no alternative but to declare man’s freedom to exercise his 
faculties; for without this freedom fulfilment of the Divine will is impossible. 
There is clearly no alternative but to declare the several limitations of that 
freedom needful for the achievement of greatest happiness. And there is 
clearly no alternative but to develop the first and chief of these limitations 
separately; seeing as we have done that a development of the others is at 
present impossible (88).  
Spencer’s style, self-consciously blocking off potential channels of thought in order to 
construct an argument that in retrospect appears logically necessary, is the antithesis of 
Dickensian style, which plays with potentialities. Great Expectations provides perhaps the 
most famous statement of Dickens’ tarrying with the alternative: 
That was a memorable day to me, for it made great changes in me. But, it is 
the same with any life. Imagine one selected day struck out of it, and think 
how different its course would have been. Pause you who read this, and 
think for a moment of the long chain of iron or gold, of thorns or flowers, 
that would never have bound you, but the formation of the first link on one 
memorable day. (72) 
The passage is remarkable for the way in which potentiality arises out of homogeneity (“it is 
the same with any life”), a shift reflected in the paradoxical status of ‘struck’, which at first 
appears as a figure of deletion (“struck out”) but with the introduction of the chain imagery 
(imported, of course, from elsewhere in the novel) recalls striking as an act of forging, of 
creation. ‘Struck’ here acts in similar manner to Gerard Manley Hopkins’ ‘buckle’ in “The 
Windhover” (1877; published 1917) (another image of metalwork, incidentally), where the 
diametrically opposed meanings of breaking and binding co-exist without one having priority 
over the other; Dickens’ passage enacts the shift in interpretation it asks its readers to 
consider in their own personal histories. 
Dickens deploys the Spencerian phrasing occasionally, but does so in order to 
undermine it; when Dickens’ characters claim they have ‘no alternative,’ they frequently 
refer either to bathetically inconsequential conflicts, or events that never happen despite 
claims of inevitability, in stark contrast to Spencer’s usage of the term to indicate logical or 
political necessity. Anticipating Spencer, the phrase and its variants appear most frequently in 
The Pickwick Papers. On their journey to Bath, Pickwick encounters a “fierce gentleman” 
called Mr Dowler, who recounts the story of winning his present wife from a rival suitor: 
“I said I had pledged my word as a gentleman to skin him. My character was at 
stake. I had no alternative. As an officer in His Majesty’s service, I was bound 
to skin him. I regretted the necessity, but it must be done. He was open to 
conviction. He saw that the rules of the service were imperative. He fled. I 
married her.” (581) 
Dowler may be a comedically angry character, but the specificity of his threats of skinning a 
rival are clearly overblown and never actually come to pass. The phrase of having ‘no 
alternative’ becomes associated with Dowler, when later in the novel Dowler backs off from 
the threat of a duel with Winkle: 
As the real state of the case dawned upon Mr Winkle’s mind, he looked very 
terrible, and said he was perfectly satisfied; but at the same time, said so, with 
an air that left Mr Dowler no alternative but to infer that if he had not been, 
something most horrible and destructive must inevitably have occurred. (631)  
Readers, on the other hand, know that Dowler is too quick to foreclose the alternative of 
reading the situation correctly; that, in fact, that the proposed duel is an entirely fictional 
possibility. On the bathetic use of ‘no alternative’, in Bath the Pickwickians witness the 
resignation of the footman Whiffers, who when pressed for an explanation “had no 
alternative but to state, boldly and distinctly, that he had been required to eat cold meat” 
(615). The only genuine ‘no alternative’ in The Pickwick Papers refers, again bathetically, to 
the laws of physics, when Ben Allen comedically attempts to strangle the surly Mr Martin, 
after hearing that Arabella has married Winkle. Martin “felled Mr Benjamin to the ground. 
As that gentleman had his hands entangled in his cravat, he had no alternative but to follow 
him to the floor” (767).  
A more subtle undermining of the phrase (this time deployed in precisely Spencerian 
arrangement) occurs at the other end of Dickens’ career. In The Mystery of Edwin Drood, 
when the Dean insists that the suspected Neville Landless should leave the shelter of 
Crisparkle’s house (lest giving sanctuary to an assumed murderer should tarnish the church), 
he caps the argument with “There is no alternative, as your good sense has discovered” (185). 
The irony here is that Crisparkle’s ‘discovery’ is really the Dean’s projection of his own 
assurance (‘“And if it be a necessity-” Crisparkle faltered. “As you unfortunately find it to 
be,” returned the Dean’ (185)). Yet Dickens tends to use ‘alternative’ somewhat sparingly; 
after the atypical The Pickwick Papers, the term usually appears once or twice per novel. 
Strikingly, in the three novels most structurally and thematically concerned with alternatives 
– the competing timelines of A Christmas Carol, the dual narration of Bleak House, and the 
double visions of A Tale of Two Cities – the word is entirely absent. 
 This is not, however, to say that the subjunctive does not appear at the linguistic level 
in Dickens’ work, but rather only to historicise ‘alternative’ as a more modern framing of 
narrative potential. Where we might say ‘alternative’, Dickens preferred ‘as if,’ a rhetorical 
figure which has attracted increased critical attention in the last ten or so years. Julian 
Wolfreys notes that ‘as if’ partially derives from the Kantian als ob (as though, as if), and 
“installs in writing the possibility of imaging a relation between experience or fact and a 
fictionalized experience….. The as if names a ‘fictional’ condition, an imagined and therefore 
phantasmatic possibility that is not a lie, but which either has not happened, or which, more 
significantly, cannot be experienced as such…. As if institutes a hinge if you will between the 
possible and the impossible. It names the spectral condition of imagination as the projection 
of fiction and narratives” (12). Likewise, John Reed draws on an Iserian model of ‘the 
imaginary’ as proposing that “underlying all human intellectual activity is our power to 
conceive, in an ‘as if’ manner, what does not yet exist” (Reed 22). Philip Davis considers the 
rhetorical strategy of ‘as if’ in William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience, arguing 
that the trope frames “ideas that seem to create a vitality in us and make for greater possible 
movement into a future…. [T]hey are instrumental and provisional, essays in the very process 
of our making ourselves do more and be more and go further than we might dare in advance” 
(46). The Kantian ‘as if’ encompasses alternatives in the present (the fictional condition), 
whereas James’ has a more temporal (and self-actualising) dimension; that which is to come. 
There is a sense in which all fiction already fulfils the condition of the as if – that 
which has not actually happened, but is not exactly a lie – but this does not get us very far. 
Rather, there is something in the ‘as if’ which also calls attention to itself as the possibility of 
an alternative; that we are reading this particular fiction, and not another. This somewhat 
excessive figure of the ‘as if’ underwrites Reed’s argument that Dickens subverts the 
expectations of realism through the depiction of a reality at once heightened and subjunctive. 
Reed refers to this mode as ‘hyperrealism,’ but the phrase most frequently tied to ‘as if’ in 
recent critical discourse, as if to connect historicist rhetoric to the language of technology, is 
‘virtual reality’; see, for instance, Michael Saler’s As If: Modern Enchantment and the 
Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality (2012) and Jonathan Farina’s influential article for 
Victorian Studies, ‘“Dickens’s As If”: Analogy and Victorian Virtual Reality’ (2011).  
 This latter discussion is of particular relevance to Alternative Dickens. Farina 
helpfully tabulates the occurrence of the ‘as if’ figure in Dickens’ works: “411 in Dombey 
and Son (1846-48), 393 in David Copperfield (1849-50), 392 in Our Mutual Friend, 266 in 
the substantially shorter Great Expectations (1860-61)”; 311 in Bleak House (Farina 427, 
429). For Farina, “As if underwrites the way Victorians could know, and this epistemology 
suggests they could only know reality to the degree that they could know each other. 
Recurrent ‘as ifs’ present the narrative in which they occur as a conjectural history of some 
real story that purportedly precedes, exceeds, or otherwise eludes its narrator’s perspective” 
(432). The crucial point here is the connection Farina makes between subjunctive 
epistemology and character, noting how Dickens’ deployment of ‘as if’ marks moral and 
emotional complexity in character (in, for instance, Esther’s narration in Bleak House); the 
use of “conditional simile characterizes Victorian feeling as virtual experience irreducible to 
words” (430). In other words, it is those characters who are the most keenly aware of the 
inadequacies of describing feeling and experience that have recourse to conditional analogy 
and the subjunctive. This depth of character becomes associated with moral depth; noting the 
centrality of analogy and ‘as if’ to John Tyndall’s Fragments of Science (1892), Farina argues 
that for Tyndall, the moral dimension of ‘as if’ emerges: that which “epitomizes a moral 
imperative and self-abnegating principle inherent in the proper scientist” (Farina 434). ‘As if’ 
implies a proper doubt and scepticism that distinguishes knowledge from dogmatism: “‘As if’ 
bespeaks both the depth of subjects of scientific inquiry and the moral depth of those who 
study it properly” (434). The conditions by which we know the world are also those by which 
we know others, and both are reliant on the ‘as if’ of analogy. Farina is careful here to 
dissociate his use of ‘virtual reality’ from its modern technological sense; rather, Dickens’ ‘as 
ifs’ “conceptualize reality itself as virtual, as the abstract depth of a character” (433). To 
return to alternatives, Farina’s ‘as if’ provides the counterweight to my ‘no alternative,’ both 
in the sense that the Dickensian “‘As if’ imagines access to foreclosed perspectives” (429), 
and that the use of ‘no alternative’ in Dickens indicates shallowness of moral character, from 
the blustering cowardice of Dowler to the rhetorical trickery of the Dean of Cloisterham. 
 While in these introductory comments I have focused on a particular manifestation of 
the subjunctive and the alternative, the following articles that comprise Alternative Dickens 
take a broader view. They explore a range of Dickensian alternatives, from the inscription of 
alternatives within the texts (through gestures of doubling and recycling) to alternatives to 
Dickens in the form of plagiarists, copyists, and implied different endings. The article closest 
to the linguistic subjunctive is Camilla Uelland Hoel’s “Secret Plots: The False Endings of 
Dickens’ Novels”, which considers the deployment of narrative alternatives within the novels 
themselves. Hoel takes as her theoretical starting point Susan K. Gilman and Robert L. 
Patten’s discussion of the ‘ontogenetic’ qualities of Dickens’ work, in which narrators 
imagine a wide variety of possible futures for characters (most notably Esther’s speculations 
on alternative outcomes while travelling with Bucket in Bleak House). Hoel notes that 
Gillman and Patten’s suggestive discussion of alternatives largely restricts itself to analysis of 
character; Hoel moves the discussion to that of plot, arguing that Dickens’ plots spectrally 
imply alternatives (most literally, of course, in A Christmas Carol), with the resolutions of 
the novels providing what Hoel describes as ‘false endings’ that, through the disjuncture 
between narrative closure and the socio-political questions raised through the texts, imply 
that some other ending is possible. Through readings of the problematic conclusions of Oliver 
Twist, Little Dorrit, and Our Mutual Friend, Hoel demonstrates how Dickensian resolutions 
draw attention to their very fictionality, and thus trigger resistant readings, and the 
imagination of alternative endings. Hoel traces the growing sophistication with which 
Dickens’ resolutions hint at alternative narratives just below the surface; in his early career, 
narrative problems are resolved through too neat a concatenation of coincidence that leave 
political questions untouched (Oliver Twist); later novel endings feature ostentatiously 
complex chains of relation and inheritance that Dickens himself required mnemonic 
assistance to navigate (Hoel quotes Hilary Schor’s observation that recent editors of Little 
Dorrit have found it necessary to include a summary of the complex network of wills that 
resolve the novel, and still get the details wrong). This movement culminates in Our Mutual 
Friend’s challenge to the reader to construct their own narratives (that is, to become of that 
text’s many storytellers), though Hoel argues that Dickens ultimately moves away from a 
narrowly defined ontogenetic mode towards a more doubled sense of narrative that keeps 
alternatives in play.  
Michelle Wilson’s “Buried Narratives, Secret Plots: Exhuming the Mother’s Story in 
Oliver Twist” starts strikingly with reflections on a different kind of alternative; the ways in 
which literary texts subvert our critical expectations, moving projects into different lines of 
enquiry. Wilson finds that Twist initially refused to fit into her initial project, leading to a 
reconceptualization of her account of mothers, father, and inheritance. Noting that the novel 
immediately kills off Oliver’s mother, and seems to be successful in keeping her dead, 
Wilson notes that Oliver Twist poses another question: what happens when the mother dies in 
the wrong place? Oliver himself becomes the trace – both the clue and the pathway – to 
unravelling this problem. In Wilson’s reading, the dead mother’s story is supplanted by the 
paternal inheritance plot, even though the narrative interest keeps moving back towards the 
absent mother (and, as Wilson argues, while paternity is the force which makes meaning out 
of the novel’s complex inheritance plot, paternity must first be proved through the 
establishment of maternity). Oliver, insisting on the dead status of his mother (not least to 
Noah Claypole), finds this parental role instead filled by a variety of competing characters 
(Fagin, Nancy, and Sally) two laws: the Poor Law, and the laws of narrative. Death and 
storytelling become the intertwined narratives of Oliver Twist; Wilson concludes that the 
women of the novel – including Agnes – are ‘reverse Scheherazdes’, for whom death is the 
price of having a story to tell. 
Two articles consider alternatives to Dickens through the prism of literary 
competition. Ruth Doherty’s “Blest or t’othered: Alternative Graveyards in Bleak House, 
Reynolds, and Walker”, considers the notoriously antagonistic literary relationship of 
Dickens and G. W. M. Reynolds, offering historicised readings of the graveyard spaces of 
Bleak House and The Mysteries of London. Doherty positions these texts as alternatives to 
each other, exploring the same sets of symbols but with reference to different implied 
readerships and literary styles. For Doherty, Dickens’ style relies for its effect on the 
alternatives provided by the reader’s imagination; Reynolds, by contrast, attempts to provide 
a more comprehensive, visceral description of bodily decay. Plagiarism enters the equation 
via Reynolds’ verbatim redeployments of contemporary medical accounts of graveyards, 
most notably the doctor and sanitary reformer George Alfred Walker. Walker becomes the 
triangulating figure between Dickens and Reynolds; both were aware of the reformer’s 
writings, but engaged with them in fundamentally different ways. Doherty uses these contexts 
to articulate a new reading of Krook’s spontaneous combustion, moving beyond 
contemporary associations of Krook’s death with alcoholism, and more recent critical 
accounts that reduce spontaneous combustion to a metaphorical image of social and legal 
corruption. Her discussion invites us to reconsider the material world of Bleak House, hinting 
at a recycling economy more usually associated with Our Mutual Friend; where, exactly, 
does repurposed coffin wood end up? Finally, Matthew Crofts explores another kind of 
potential recycling, noting that the gothic doubling of A Tale of Two Cities extends beyond 
the boundaries of the text to the parallels between Dickens’ novel and Watts Phillips’ play 
The Dead Heart, a familiar sounding drama of imprisonment in the Bastille, eventual release, 
and heroic self-sacrifice. Watts’ play was accused of plagiarising Dickens’ novel, a claim 
which while not entirely refuted by Phillips’ supporters, was at least questioned, not least by 
reviewers who saw Phillips’ work as superior. As Crofts points out, the play was revived by 
Henry Irving in 1899, leading to a resurrection of questions of Dickensian intellectual 
property some time after these issues had vexed Dickens himself (Irving himself consulted A 
Tale of Two Cities in his restaging of The Dead Heart, leading to a dizzying circling of 
influence). The various claims and counter-claims of plagiarism that surround these two 
contemporaneous texts complicate ideas of the alternative, unsettling any easy conception of 
original and copy. As Mark Fisher notes in the quotation discussed at the outset of the 
introduction, the alternative is already the mainstream. 
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